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Deviations from modern public sector accounting principles and standards are po-
tentially politically motivated. To avoid jeopardizing adherence to the institution-
alized self-constraining debt brake mechanisms, financial flexibility is aimed to 
be preserved in the institutional framework governing public finances. This paper 
elaborates and discusses potential tensions between debt containment rules and 
the application of true and fair accounting at the example of three Swiss cantons 
by building on case-based empirical evidence, which was gained out of semi-struc-
tured interviews. 
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, fiscal deficits and public debt among OECD countries in-
creased drastically. In this context, instruments fostering fiscal discipline have 
been promoted to restore the financial situation and to ensure sustainability 
in public spending policy in order to preserve future service delivery capacity 
(IMF, 2009). The theoretical fundaments justifying fiscal discipline have been 
originally developed by public choice scholars such as Buchanan (1958, 1964, 
1991) with his well-known golden rule of public finance or Tollison and Wag-
ner (1987), who advocated fiscal/budget rules in order to contain government 
size. While most literature focuses on fiscal performance in the presence of 
fiscal rules (Yerly, 2013; Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes & Stein, 1999) or the 
analysis of different design options (Yerly, 2013; Hallerberg, Strauch & von 
Hagen, 2007), only few authors consider the accounting dimension and tech-
nical aspects despite the fact that fiscal rules (i.e. debt brakes) usually build on 
accrual accounting information (Bergmann, 2012). Yet, this connection was 
subject of research concerned with the rise of creative accounting and fiscal 
gimmickry in the presence of fiscal rules (Von Hagen & Wolff, 2006; Koen 
& van den Noord, 2005; Milesi-Ferretti, 2003), which was inspired by politi-
cal economy literature advocating that politicians and public decision mak-
ers have a strong incentive to embellish budget outcomes (Alesina & Perotti, 
1995). Following this avenue of research, this paper serves the illumination of 
the connection between debt brake mechanisms and the adoption of modern 
public sector accounting standards and principles in the interface of political 
economy in the Swiss context. Therefore, the first part of this paper is dedi-
cated to the derivation of a literature based conceptual framework taking an 
integrated view (Chapters 2 & 3), on which basis in the second part, three cases 
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from Switzerland will be examined and discussed from a technical accounting 
perspective (Chapters 4 & 5). 
2 Foundations and theoretical background
Emergence of fiscal rules and debt brakes is strongly coined by the Public 
Choice view, following which debt finance induces fiscal illusion, because 
usually government imperfectly discounts the future tax obligations result-
ing from the debt financing (Buchanan, 1997: 121). Nevertheless, based on 
the economic argument of intergenerational equity stipulated by Musgrave 
(1959, 1963), the cost related to capital investment can be shared among the 
different generations of users. In that case, government is allowed to borrow, 
but solely to finance capital investment so that the debt has a counter-part 
in the government’s assets and its reimbursement follows the so-called pay-
as-you-use principle. The principle derives from the consideration that assets 
create not only a benefit for the current generation, but also for the succeeding 
ones. Therefore, it is argued to be legitimate to charge future generations their 
respective part for using and benefiting from the assets. 
Fiscal rules or debt brakes have a long history in Switzerland and the pi-
oneering canton of St. Gallen introduced its debt containment mechanism 
already in 1929 as part of its fiscal law. Over the past three decades the 
majority of the Swiss cantons have reformed their fiscal legislations and 
introduced or revised the underlying debt brake mechanisms (Yerly, 2013). 
Thereby the cantons are autonomous and individually elaborate their respec-
tive legislation to govern public spending. The cantons have a high degree 
of autonomy regarding the introduction of fiscal rules, as well as regarding 
the implementation of accounting practices. However, the cantonal fiscal dis-
cipline regimes are framed by horizontal organization and the Conference 
of Cantonal Finance Directors (CCFD) issued recommendations with regard 
to fiscal discipline and accounting. In its handbook, published in 2008, the 
CCFD stipulated new accounting practices (Harmonized Accounting Modell 2 
(HAM2)) as well as guidance for the elaboration of fiscal laws (CCFD, 2017). 
In particular, the HAM2 contains modern public sector accounting standards, 
which emerged subsequently to the stronger demand for accurate financial 
information for accountability and decision-making purpose as part of the 
New Public Management reform wave and the efforts undertaken to align 
public sector accounting with private sector practice (Fuchs, Bergmann & 
Brusca, 2017). Alignment of public sector accounting to private sector stand-
ards is also promoted by the International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
(IPSAS) (IPSASB, 2016). While few cantons (e.g. Zurich, Lucerne and Geneva) 
already implemented IPSAS, the majority adopted or will adopt HAM2, which 
itself is based on IPSAS and could therefore be seen as a lean version of IPSAS 
(Fuchs, Bergmann & Brusca, 2017). However, this Swiss tailor-made adoption 
of IPSAS is not as strict as the standard it originates from, since it only has the 
Pascal Horni, Nadia Yerly, Gabriel Trinkler: Debt containment rules in the era of true and fair accounting:  
Fiscal leeway between hammer and anvil. Yearbook of Swiss Administrative Sciences 2017: Pages 104–115 
106
characteristic of a recommendation and thus leaves a lot of room for choices 
in the application. 
Following the argument advocated in political economy literature that pol-
iticians and public decision makers are driven by the axioms of maximization 
of votes and competition for control (Downs, 1957), flexibility in the appli-
cation of accounting standards and principles as set out in the HAM2 or in 
the IPSAS is prone to be used opportunistically in the presence of fiscal rules. 
According to Ingram’s (1984) notion, government accounting practices de-
velop under the influence of politicians and hence are subject of electoral con-
siderations. Since government accounting and reporting traditionally serves 
the purpose of accountability and addresses citizens and voters, the financial 
position has a signaling effect and serves as a proxy for political management 
capabilities, which affects, according to Brusca & Montesinos’ (2006) analysis, 
the outcome of local elections in Spain. Reischmann (2016) demonstrated in 
his panel data analysis that following the election cycle, governments applied 
measures of creative accounting to gloss over deficit figures by using so-called 
stock-flow adjustments, which are measured by using “the difference between 
budget deficits and the change in public debt” as suggested by Milesi-Feretti 
(2003). The paper of Von Hagen & Wolff (2006) applies the same method to 
measure creative accounting and provides evidence that the implementation 
of fiscal rules in the European Union (excessive deficit procedure and the 
stability and growth pact) have induced measures of creative accounting to 
improve deficit figures. While there exist a number of other studies dealing 
with creative measures to sugarcoat government finances and creating fiscal 
illusion (i.e. Irwin, 2012 or Koen & van den Noord, 2005), this paper focuses on 
the impact of deviations explicitly made from modern public sector account-
ing principles and standards associated with IPSAS or HAM2 implementation 
on the debt brake’s biting. 
3 Conceptual framework
Since in Switzerland the cantons self-elaborate their fiscal rules and have 
some flexibility with regard to the adoption and application of public sector 
accounting standards and principles, the design of the institutional framework 
governing public finances has several potential outcomes. The illustration be-
neath summarizes these possible outcomes, which will be further elaborated in 
the subsequent paragraphs and on which basis a hypothesis for the empirical 
part of this paper (Chapter 5) will be derived. 
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Figure 1: Outcome matrix of the institutional framework governing public finances (Source: the 
authors)
A rigid institutional framework consisting of strict fiscal rules and an account-
ing framework being fully compliant with modern public sector accounting 
principles and standards 
(i.e. HRM2 / IPSAS) fostering a true and fair view is expected to be seen 
not that often in practice, as this combination does not leave any room for 
politically motivated adjustments. However, in order to reach an annual result 
compliant to the rules set out as part of the debt brake mechanism and to avoid 
constraining public spending policy to the extent of austerity, preservation of 
leeway for fiscal manoeuvres apart from gimmickry is likely to be favoured 
from a political economy perspective. Therefore the combination of a strict 
debt brake mechanism and an accounting policy not giving rise to any room 
of interpretation and choice is deemed as the least preferred institutional de-
sign option, which could be described as a tight corset and will be referred to 
as “tight, true and fair” in the subsequent paragraphs of this paper. 
Some guideline for the design of the institutional framework is provided 
in the exemplary fiscal law contained in the HAM2. It proposes stipulations 
with regard to both – the implementation of a debt brake and accounting and 
reporting policies (CCFD, 2017). Debt brake mechanisms, as implemented in 
most Swiss cantons in form of a balanced budget rule, could range from less 
strict to strict depending on the architecture chosen (Yerly, 2013). While there 
exists a fine-tuned index to measure strictness of fiscal rules (see Yerly, 2013), 
such a method for the measurement of the accounting and reporting dimen-
sion of the institutional framework does not exist yet. 
Even the strictest debt brake, which is institutionalized in Switzerland in 
the canton of St. Gallen according to the scale developed by Yerly (2013), has 
a clause to loosen the tight corset. In the canton of St. Gallen it is possible 
to cover yearly expenses by earmarking funds from available equity in the 
budget process, which basically implies that a deficit can be budgeted as 
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long as sufficient equity is available (StVG § 61) (Canton St. Gallen, 1994). 
In consequence, a budget with a deficit could still be implemented without 
compromising compliance with the debt brake. Hence, the debt brake of the 
canton of St. Gallen comes strictly into force, when the freely available equity 
is insufficient and a deficit could no longer be absorbed. Therefore, the freely 
available equity serves as a rainy day fund, which however could be misused 
by politicians to present a debt brake compliant budget without constraining 
public spending too much and thus leaving potential activation of the debt 
brake to future generations. In the absence of such a clause, when equity can-
not be accessed in the budgeting process and used to cover expenses, a debt 
brake is armed ultimately without any extra criteria. The example of the can-
ton of St. Gallen makes the broader scope of fiscal rules apparent and empha-
sises the need for an elaboration from a micro-level perspective considering 
the accounting dimension. In particular, this paper aims to analyse potential 
tensions between true and fair accounting and debt containment rules and to 
elaborate whether in practice the institutional design outcome option “tight, 
true and fair” is considered as a feasible option, or whether it is repelled. 
4 Research Method
To investigate whether “tight, true and fair” is not chosen in practice, as hy-
pothetically formulated previously, the last part of this paper is dedicated to 
a contextual discussion in which three cantonal examples will be illuminated 
with regard to deviations made from accounting standards and principles. It is 
therefore a preliminary attempt to assess the vertical axis of the institutional 
framework’s outcome matrix (see figure 1), following a qualitative research 
approach. In analysing this topic, empirical evidence gained out of semi-struc-
tured interviews with director level staff from cantonal finance administra-
tions, as well as relevant policy documents will be considered. The semi-struc-
tured interviews were conducted by following a prepared set of questions, 
which served as a guideline during the course of the interview. However, the 
sequence and the conversation in general were kept open and followed an 
explorative approach. The applied form of explorative questioning allowed 
to respond immediately to the answers given and to deepen certain issues. A 
transcript of each interview was created and sent to the interviewee for confir-
mation purpose and in order to provide the opportunity to correct or comple-
ment statements to avoid misinterpretation. Based on the interview transcripts 
and policy documents, three possible areas of tension between deviations from 
accounting standards and the institutionalized debt brakes could be identified. 
5 True and Fair Accounting and Fiscal Leeway at the example of three 
Swiss Cantons
Similar to a previous publication of the authors (Yerly, Trinkler & Horni, 2017), 
this chapter serves the contextual discussion and comparative analysis of the 
insights gained out of the three semi-structured interviews carried out with 
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director level staff of the finance administrations of the cantons of Lucerne, 
St. Gallen and Zurich.1 The insights are discussed and compared on a clus-
tered basis, following the main areas of existing tensions between modern 
government accounting and fiscal rules, which were identified as part of the 
explorative analysis building on the interview transcripts, cantonal policy 
documents and existing literature. 
5.1 Consolidation Scope
According to IPSAS, the scope of consolidation of public sector financial 
statements is determined by the criteria of control, which is given under the 
circumstances that the involvement of a public sector entity in another entity 
is beneficial financially or non-financially and is accompanied by the abil-
ity to execute power given by existing rights to direct relevant activities of 
that entity (IPSASB, 2016). This is in particular the case if the public sector 
has ownership interest of more than 50 percent. In consideration of that, the 
cantons would be obliged to consolidate all state owned enterprises (SOE), re-
gardless of whether the activities of the controlled entity are dissimilar (IPSAS 
35.8). Notwithstanding, the cantons do deviate to the prescriptions outset by 
IPSAS in practice. None of the three cantons being subject of this contextual 
discussion for instance consolidates its cantonal bank2, thus defining the con-
solidation scope more narrowly. In the canton of Zurich, consolidation scope 
is regulated by law (CRG § 54) (Canton Zurich, 2006) and the consolidation 
of an entity depends on the condition whether material government funding 
is provided for the operations of that entity, whereby materiality is defined 
as a threshold of CHF 20 million (RLV § 28) (Canton Zurich, 2007). With this 
legislation the canton of Zurich explicitly excludes government business en-
terprises (GBE)3 from consolidation, even when they are subject of control 
and owned by the government. While according to the law (FLG § 42) (Canton 
Lucerne, 2010), consolidation in the canton of Lucerne follows the principle 
of control as defined in IPSAS, exceptions can be made if transparency, clar-
ity or information value of the consolidated financial statements would be 
constrained. In consideration of those criteria, the canton of Lucerne decided 
not to consolidate its cantonal bank, as a completely distorted picture would 
result. Such a decision is within the jurisdiction of the legislative and the 
consolidation scope is therefore deemed as more loosely defined compared 
to the canton of Zurich and could be changed more easily. Since the can-
1 Interviews were conducted with Hansjörg Kaufmann (Canton Lucerne), Flavio Büsser (Canton St. 
Gallen) and Basilius Scheidegger (Canton Zurich).
2 Cantonal Banks are majority owned by the cantons and run an ordinary banking business. They 
differ to other commercial banks with regard to their foundation, which was driven by regional-
economic considerations in times of a credit squeeze during industrialization in the 19th century
3 As defined in IPSAS 1 main characteristic of GBE’s is that in the normal course of its business, 
goods and services to other entities (or individuals) are sold at a profit or full cost recovery and 
therefore GBE’s are not reliant on continuing government funding.
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tonal fiscal rules build on accounting information, their scope depends on the 
composition of the public sector financial statement and hence is coined by 
the consolidation scope defined in the accounting policy. In view of the debt 
brake, determination of consolidation scope could be used as an opportunistic 
gimmick to exclude entities adversely impacting compliance to it. According 
to Irwin (2012), not counting government entities and their liabilities is a com-
mon way to reduce the reported debt figure in the Euro zone. With regard to 
the exemptions made in the three analysed cantons and their deviation from 
IPSAS 35, it becomes evident that they are clearly not politically motivated 
to out-scope liabilities in order to undergo the institutionalized debt brakes. 
Moreover, these deviations are attributable to greater clarity and ease of un-
derstanding of the financial statements and for practicability issues. Neverthe-
less, this does underpin how deviations to accounting standards and principles 
could undermine the existing fiscal rules and evade the institutional design 
option of tight true and fair public finances. 
5.2 Recognition of Assets
Recognition of assets and in particular determination of the capitalisation 
limit was identified as another area of diverging accounting practices, which 
could possibly affect the triggering of debt brakes. Following the basic princi-
ples of accounting, assets acquired in the accounting period below the defined 
capitalisation threshold are recognized as expense and are therefore reported 
in the income statement. As in all three cantons being subject of this research, 
the implemented debt brakes explicitly (Canton Lucerne, 2010; Canton Zurich, 
2006) or implicitly (Canton St. Gallen, 1994)4 target the income statement or 
specific line items of it and aim to have an equilibrium of income and expense 
over a defined time period, recognition practice of fixed and immaterial assets 
impacts the debt brake’s biting. With regard to recognition practice, the three 
cantons have defined different capitalisation thresholds, as the figure below 
illustrates. 
4 Subject of equilibrium of the canton St. Gallen’s debt brake is the budgeted income statement, 
which shall not contain a surplus in expenses larger than three percent of the simple tax income 
(StVG § 61). Any surplus of expenses resulting from budget execution has to be covered either 
through freely available equity or carried forward to the next period (StVG § 64).
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Figure 2: Capitalisation Thresholds of the cantons according to their legislation  
Source: the authors
If the capitalisation threshold is high, as in the canton of St. Gallen, any ac-
quisition of fixed or immaterial assets below the threshold reflects an increase 
in expenses in the current accounting period, despite the fact that useful life 
of that asset is longer and hence costs for acquisition should be spread over 
the period of useful life following the accrual accounting rationale. What the 
applied accounting practice in the canton of St. Gallen with its CHF 3 million 
capitalisation threshold reflects, is basically just a contemporaneous activa-
tion and one-off depreciation. This practice might be against the criteria of 
intergenerational fairness, which is at the heart of the rationale of fiscal rules 
(Yerly, 2013), and does not comply with the True and Fair view principle, but 
does bottom-line not necessarily ease adherence to the debt brake – if not 
vice versa. While capitalised acquisitions and their respective accompanying 
expenses in form of depreciation in forthcoming fiscal years are spread over 
time and the period, in which fiscal equilibrium has to be reached according 
to the debt brake, non-capitalisation charges the income statement immedi-
ately leading to more volatile expenses, which needs to be considered in fiscal 
planning. Meanwhile, the canton of St. Gallen’s recognition practice is not 
ultimately driven by considerations aiming to preserve financial flexibility in 
presence of the debt brake and can be deemed as defensive. 
5.3 Recognition of Changes in Fair Value
The third area identified as part of this explorative research, which could 
be an obstacle towards tight, true and fair public finances and could serve 
as an adjusting screw to prevent fiscal policy being corseted too tightly by 
the established institutional framework, is the treatment of changes in fair 
value. Impairment gains and losses are recognized in the income statement 
and hence impact achievement of fiscal equilibrium. The canton Lucerne does, 
unlike prescribed by IPSAS 16.44 (Investment Property), not reflect changes in 
fair value of assets held for investment purpose in its income statement and 
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rather recognizes it in equity in a revaluation account. In consideration that 
revaluation gains are not realised, this practice is prudent. However, non-rec-
ognition of revaluation losses means that once the loss is realised, there is a 
one-off deficit leading to additional expenses in one fiscal year, which could 
turn the scales and trigger the debt brake. As only the operative result is sub-
ject of the canton of Lucerne’s debt brake and realisation of revaluation gains 
and losses from assets held for investment purpose are likely to be deemed 
as an extraordinary result, the applied accounting practice does not pose an 
inconsistency in the interplay with the debt brake. However, the exclusion of 
extraordinary results from the debt brake’s sphere could be highly advanta-
geous from a fiscal-policy perspective and prevent the debt brake’s biting. 
The recommendations of the CCFD entailed in the HAM2 regarding the 
treatment of changes in fair value of assets held for investment purpose, which 
could potentially be sold without constraining fulfilment of public services, 
stipulate the recognition of revaluation gains and losses in surplus or deficit, 
like the IPSAS. They further explicitly state that changes in fair value have to 
be deemed to the extraordinary result in the income statement (CCFD, 2017). 
In that view, it is crucial to know whether the debt brake targets the operating 
result or the extraordinary one. 
6 Conclusion
All the previously mentioned examples reveal that deviations from accounting 
standards and principles affect the debt brake. A discussion on fiscal rules 
is therefore deemed to be of minor use if the accounting dimension is not 
included. Legislation with regard to accounting and preparation of financial 
statements is therefore recommended to be considered in the (re-)engineering 
process of debt brake mechanisms. 
Prudence and feasibility seem to be the superficial motives for deviations 
to modern accounting principles and standards, rather than the maintenance 
of financial flexibility to hedge against the threat of austerity measures that 
could be a consequence of the violation of the debt brake. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be excluded that political economy considerations did not influence 
the establishment of the current institutional framework containing clauses 
and room for manoeuvres to different extent, but influencing the timing of the 
triggering of the debt brake. The assumption derived from political economy 
literature and the conceptual argument put forward as part of this paper, that 
tight, true and fair public finances are the least preferred outcome option of 
the institutional framework’s design, is therefore recommended to be subject 
of further research. In particular does this article underpin the connection 
of accounting standard application and fiscal rules and shows the need for 
a holistic view and more integrated research including technical accounting 
aspects. 
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Zusammenfassung
Abweichungen gegenüber den heutigen Rechnungslegungsstandards und -Prin-
zipien des öffentlichen Gemeinwesens sind potentiell politisch motiviert. Um 
die Einhaltung der selbst auferlegten Schuldenbremsen nicht zu gefährden, ist 
man versucht finanzpolitischen Spielraum zu bewahren und den institutionel-
len Rahmen zur Steuerung öffentlicher Finanzen entsprechend zu gestalten und 
auszurichten. Dieser Beitrag untersucht und diskutiert mögliche Spannungsfel-
der zwischen Schuldenbremse-Regelungen und der Anwendung von modernen 
Rechnungslegungsnormen am Beispiel von drei Kantonen. 
Schlagworte: Schuldenbremsen, Rechnungslegung, IPSAS, Politische 
Ökonomie 
Résumé
Le fait de contrevenir aux principes et aux normes comptables actuelles du sec-
teur public, est potentiellement motivé politiquement. Pour éviter d’enfreindre 
les règles institutionnelles de frein à l’endettement, il peut être préférable de 
garder une flexibilité financière dans la gestion publique à l’intérieur d’un cadre 
institutionnel donné. Ce papier élabore et discute les tensions potentielles entre 
les règles contraignant les finances et l’application du principe « true and fair » 
en comptabilité publique. Basée sur les cas de trois cantons Suisses, l’analyse 
empirique a été menée en suivant la méthode dite « semi-structurée » (qualita-
tive).
Mots-clés : frein à l’endettement, tenue des comptes publics, IPSAS, 
économie politique
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